IGCS organized a symposium on peacekeeping in Africa at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Conference and Study Center at Bellagio, Italy. The conference, which was held June 7-11, 1999, had 22 participants, including Crawford Young, Lloyd Dumas, W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Mahmoud Mamdani, Jonah Isawa Elagwu, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Yusuf Bangura, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Ambassador Josef Bucher, Francis Deng, Safih Bookor, Bereket Selassie, Maj. Gen. Chris Garuba, Brig. Gen. John Shagaya, Hussein Adam, João Honwana, J. Michael Turner, H. S. Galadima, Julius Ihonubere, Edward McMahon, Manas Chatterji, Ali A. Mazrui and Ricardo René Laremont. The following are excerpts from an interview with Professor Ricardo René Laremont, associate director of IGCS, about that event.

Q: What was the purpose of the symposium?
A: The purpose of the symposium was to try to assemble scholars and persons who were interested in military policy in Africa and who were especially concerned with how military forces and policies can be applied to deal with conflict and civil war within African states. In the 1990s in particular, we have seen, in Africa and elsewhere, the diminution of inter-state conflicts and the increasing prevalence of intra-state conflicts. Our main concern was to address the issue of ensuring that mass murder and pogroms do not occur. We wanted to review how to re-establish regimes of law and order so that ordinary citizens are not abused or harmed by armed people.

Q: What were the fundamental issues that you discussed?
A: Inherent to the issue of how to marshal forces to prevent human carnage is another fundamental issue. How do we deal with the question of national sovereignty? We had to ask ourselves whether national sovereignty should remain an inviolable concept as we go into the 21st century. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has always perceived itself as an institution that deals with inter-state conflicts. Its principles do not allow for the transgression of borders of particular states without the permission of that sovereign state. The questions that we sought to examine at the conference were: Should we simply stand by when a) the leaders of a government are engaging in genocide; or where b) there has continued on page 2
been state failure and there is no state at all? What we examined in Sierra Leone and Liberia is similar to what was being observed, arguably, in Kosovo and, more recently, East Timor. There seems to be a movement in the international community to re-examine the question of the inviolability of national borders and to the creation of new principles of international law allowing for selective intervention based upon what is now being called humanitarian peacekeeping. All of these questions are presently being re-examined: what are the proper conditions for intervention; whether the permission of the violating state is necessarily required before intervention; and, if a decision has been made to intervene, should the intervening force be sponsored by the UN, or by regional organizations such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and SADC (Southern Africa Development Community).

Q: What were the specific issues you dealt with?

A: What we tried to do at Bellagio is to examine a variety of internal conflicts. Many of these were not inter-state but intra-state conflicts. We assessed the various ways of dealing with these conflicts and how to resolve them, some of which were sponsored by the UN while others were sponsored by regional organizations. The objective of the conference and its subsequent book involve examining varying approaches of dealing with conflict within states.

Q: Have you encountered any major theoretical or practical problems from the point of view of intervention?

A: Some of the principal problems that couldn't be resolved adequately are associated with the issue of national sovereignty. “Humanitarian intervention” may be used by some states with superior military power to simply intervene in the affairs of other states. Therefore, this idea of maintaining the inviolability of sovereignty is quite attractive to those who fear the imperialism of states who have superior military force. On the other hand, we also realize that there are conditions wherein persons are engaging in systematic abuse of other humans. I don't want to use the simple phrase “human rights,” but we are talking about decapitation, torture, systematic rape and murder. In these cases and in some circumstances, we are being told that regardless of what may transpire on the ground, you have no right to intervene because this is an internal matter. We also encountered problems determining what could be recognized as genocide or setting standards by which intervention may be deemed necessary. There was fundamental disagreement on how to proceed if and when humanitarian intervention is required. Humanitarian interventions by international institutions such as the UN and regional coalitions are also feared, because they may be dominated by one or more militarily powerful states. None of these questions were resolved at the symposium. Nonetheless, there was a consensus among the participants that the kind of genocide as was practiced in Rwanda and Burundi was unacceptable. There was also considerable lamentation about what has transpired in Algeria, in Liberia and in Sierra Leone.

Q: What was the outcome of the symposium?

A: All of us who participated have remained in contact since the conference and are continuing our dialogue. The initial set of articles from this symposium is currently being edited by the IGCS staff and will be published by the U.S. Institute of Peace in the spring of 2000. Beyond that, the institute is expanding new initiatives for fostering democratization in authoritarian states.
Interview with Immanuel Wallerstein, Director of the Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University

During the summer of 1999, Immanuel Wallerstein was interviewed by IGCS's Fouad Kalouche and Aldrin Bonilla. Wallerstein is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and director of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations at Binghamton University. A global figure, Wallerstein travels extensively throughout the world and is also based in Paris, France, at the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme — created by Fernand Braudel. Selected portions of that interview follow.

Q: Could you give those readers who are not familiar with the Fernand Braudel Center a brief idea of what its purpose and objectives are?

A: The Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations was established in 1976 for the purposes of studying long-term large-scale social change. We are interested in studying economies and civilizations from a systemic historical perspective.

Q: Could you outline the activities of the Braudel Center for us?

A: The center has a whole series of activities. 1) The most important one is the Research Working Groups, in which a group of faculty and graduate students work jointly on a research project with a designated coordinator. This collaborative effort is truly a joint research project in which outlook, decisions and revisions are decided collectively, while tasks are split up among participants. At the end of the project, a document, a single coherent book, is published. 2) The center publishes a quarterly journal, Review, which is now in its 24th year of existence. The journal is one of the few English-language journals in the world that prints features and articles in other scholarly languages — along with English résumés. We have no page limit for each article, since what we are interested in is its intellectual quality. 3) The center also runs conferences, national and international — from one to five a year. We co-sponsored some systematic international conferences with other groups, such as the International Colloquia on the World-Economy, which had 12 meetings in different parts of the world. There is also what is called the journées Braudéliennes, the fifth meeting of which will be held here at Binghamton in October. For many years, the center has been co-sponsoring with Binghamton's Middle East and North Africa Program (MENA) bi-annual conferences on the Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy, and so forth. 4) Seminars open to the general public are also organized by the center, and sometimes in cooperation with other entities. We have been running one such seminar with the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, called "Culture and the World-System." 5) We sponsor a book series at Cambridge University Press, in collaboration with the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, titled "Studies in Modern Capitalism." There have been more than 25 volumes in that series over the years. 6) We served, and this is a very important activity, as the secretariat of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. This international commission, which I chaired, has published a report ("Open the Social Sciences") that has been translated into more than 20 languages.

Q: How would you describe the center's collaboration with the Institute of Global Cultural Studies?

A: When Ali Mazrui arrived on campus — I had known him previously, of course — we decided that our interests overlapped. It was just that year that we decided to start a colloquium on Culture and the World-System, and I suggested that we co-sponsor it with IGCS. We have been collaborating on this colloquium with IGCS for more than 10 years, and we collaborate otherwise on an ad hoc basis.

Q: You have spent a fruitful life devoted to the study of the modern world-system and the complex relationship between capitalism and the world economy. Could you summarize your views for our readers — most of whom are involved in political science and Africana studies?

A: I came to the modern world-system from African studies, because I felt I had to put African studies into the context in which modern Africa had evolved. In my view, the modern world-system has been a capitalist world economy. It came into existence somewhere in the 16th century and was largely located in Western Europe — with its then-existing periphery, which was parts of Eastern Europe and parts of the Americas. The system consolidated itself and over historical time expanded to incorporate the entire globe, so it became a global system, not merely a world-system. I have been trying to explain the historical evolution of this system and the principles on which it has been operating. Thus far I have written three volumes which have more or less taken me from the beginning of the system to approximately 1800. I am working on the fourth volume now. That will surely not get me beyond the First World War, and then, I will have to continue. But it

continued on page 4
Interview with Immanuel Wallerstein continued...

is an attempt to create an overview of the historical evolution of the world system as a world system.

Q: What do you think of the new revival of quantitative methodologies in political science, for example?

A: Let me say right off that there is absolutely nothing wrong in being quantitative. Indeed, I believe that one should be as quantitative as possible. However, the religion of quantitative measures, especially when they are prematurely applied to real data, is destructive of analysis and vision. I am personally dismayed by this late conversion of the political scientists, or the submission to the neo-imperialism of neo-classical economics that has occurred. Actually, in sociology, we went through a super-quantitative phase some 20 years before political science, and we have come out of it — not that there is no more quantitative work being done in sociology — and I believe that political science will come out of it fairly soon. Quantitative data are useful in specifying certain things, but the mathematicians remind us that there are many circumstances under which qualitative data are mathematically more reliable than quantitative data.

Q: Could what is currently called "globalization" be described as a new form of hegemony? To what extent can one now talk of an increasing "incorporation" of socialized historical individuals into a world culture or civilization in the same way that regions were incorporated into the world economy?

A: Actually, my take on it is somewhat different. I must say at the beginning that I do not like the word "globalization," because it implies that something new is going on which isn’t new at all. What is going on right now is a cyclical process. We are going through the phase of capitalist traders trying to force open markets and tear down mercantilist barriers that various states have erected. This has happened before and they succeeded for a while, but new barriers are put up. We are living in one of those moments. So it is not new; I reject this entirely. It is not even more extensive than it was previously; many people have argued that statistically we were more globalized in the period roughly from 1900 to 1914 than we are today. What is it — and this goes back to my discussion of hegemony — is a mode of trying to prevent a decline in hegemony. The United States seized upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disarray caused by it in many parts of the world to push a line which was previously not taken seriously about opening markets to global finance primarily — that’s what they’re really interested in. It was temporarily and momentarily successful through U.S. and IMF pressure. But we are already living through the reaction. You see the reaction first of all, in the elections throughout Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the United States and Latin America, of what might be called social democratic governments. These social democratic governments talk a globalization line, but they were elected precisely because of the fear of their population about the impact of globalization measures. That’s the reaction of popular forces, but there is an interesting reaction going on among right-wing thinkers. Remember the so-called "Asian crisis"? People are now saying it is all over, but two years ago everyone thought there was an enormous crisis. There was, of course, the collapse of currencies, a lot of bankruptcies in a certain series of Asian countries. The IMF moved in rather draconian terms to help the states. One of the immediate results of that was the collapse of the Suharto government in Indonesia, but there were other political consequences in other countries. And all of a sudden, a severe criticism of the IMF and of the U.S. Treasury, not coming from some radical left-wingers but from people like George Schultz, Henry Kissinger and Jeffrey Sachs. All of them said, if I may summarize their views, that the IMF is absolutely crazy because, by enforcing its draconian rules, it is setting up an enormous political reaction by not taking into account the social consequences. According to them, this political reaction will result in political radicalism in a large series of countries and will be very dangerous for the survival of the system. After a year or so, the IMF is pulling back under this right-wing pressure. So much for all this talk of globalization: 10 years from now the word will have been forgotten. It is not a very useful mechanism of describing what is going on in the current world. We have had an assault of global finance, beginning in the early ’90s, which is already past its peak, and which got the popular term "globalization." Globalization was rhetoric! Globalization was an attempt to tell people, in Mrs. Thatcher’s famous words, "T.I.N.A." (There Is No Alternative). It was saying: "We are in a globalizing world; ergo, you have no alternative but to break down all the barriers, because otherwise you’ll be left behind." So it was preaching, and a few countries listened and got into trouble in various ways.

Between the African and the Indian Diasporas

The Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago funds an annual lecture named after the founder-Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric W Williams, who died in 1981. The 1999 Eric W Williams Lecturer in Port-Of-Spain, Trinidad, was Professor Ali Mazrui. He also gave a lecture at the University of the West Indies in St. Augustine, Trinidad, on the subject "Africa and India as Mothers of Diasporas.” His Eric W Williams Lecture was on “The Dual Society: From Kosovo and Cyprus to Trinidad and Tobago.” The two lectures together unleashed a debate in Trinidad as to whether indentured labor (to which Indo-Trinidadians had been subjected) was less painful than slavery (to which Afro-Trinidadians had been prey). Mazrui argued that a major reason why Indo-Trinidadians are doing better economically today than Afro-Trinidadians is because Indians have been less damaged by indentured labor than Africans have been damaged by slavery.

Q: How about the aspect of the socialization of individuals?

A: Oh yes, I should address the theory that culturally, we are more one world than we used to be. I have been around as an adult now since the Second World War, and I have heard that every year. It is nothing new and, to some extent of course, it is true: we do have e-mail, CNN and the Internet, and everybody everywhere knows more, I suppose, about what is going on in other parts of the world than previously. Although when radio came to existence, and the telegraph before that, and the newspapers before that, everybody thought that those were marvelous expansions.

So, yes! At a superficial level, everybody is doing the same thing. For example, a tradi-
tional example, music: Everybody across the world is into rock ’n’ roll, and everybody across the world is into jazz. But just this summer, I personally was at a little festival in Berlin, the point of which was to bring together jazz ensembles who were doing jazz in their own “ethnic” way. Which means that it was jazz, but it incorporated Bulgarian themes, African themes, etc. So, in the end, we have a multiplicity of musical languages that share some common structural features that we call jazz or rock ’n’ roll. I am not quite sure that makes us any more culturally integrated than we were 200 years ago. In fact, if anything, there is much more variety. It would be very wrong to see us as, somehow, a global melting pot in which variety is disappearing. We have a very richly varied world, and it hasn’t ended.

Q: Many people in Africana Studies, including Ali A. Mazrui, consider globalization as the phenomenon by which, at the macro level, we are becoming more homogeneous, while at the micro level, we are becoming more heterogeneous. What do you think of critiques of the detrimental effects of such a phenomenon on traditional cultures — take as an example the far-right movements, as well as Islamic revivalism?

A: First of all, I don’t think any of those things that you mention are traditional — if by traditional you mean that it is the same as it was 100, 200, 500 or 1,000 years ago. They are all new creations in which they mix elements that they derive from some past with which they identify and elements of the present in their own country, or locality, and another part of the world. And they make a new thing to which they give a name, and they may, for rhetorical or political purposes, say this is traditional. But “traditional” is not always a new creation. But it does not last very long: it is created and recreated all the time.

Let me give you an example. What is more traditional than language? Yet every dictionary is adding words every year. All you have to do is read a text written in 1939 in English to realize that you would never write the text that way. If you then go to 1850, you couldn’t even imagine how to write a text that way, although you still understand it. If you move back to Shakespeare’s time, then the text is difficult for you to understand, though with a little effort you can. And if you move still further back, now it really is impossible for you to understand: we call it a different language, Middle English, not Modern English. So, language, which is the most traditional thing, is changing every single day and in all parts of the world. We say there is an English language, but there are, in fact, 20 or 30 English languages, and new English languages are growing over time. As you unify languages, you also pull them apart. That is to say, there are people who used to speak X or Y, and now only speak English. But in fact, the Englishes spoken in Australia, South Africa, India, Sri Lanka and the United States are different Englishes: the words are different, the grammar is sometime different, the pronunciation is surely different, and eventually they will move apart again. Here is a perfect example of cultural non-continuity amidst continuity. Because there is continuity, since you can read Shakespeare and you can understand it — with effort — but it is also tremendously different. So it is true of all other things.

Let us go to Africa to see the difference between today and 100, 200 or 300 years ago. If you were in an African village around 1850, there was a local culture, and within the framework of that village, whoever had authority made sure that everyone observed that local culture. Those who did not were expelled from the community, or punished, or had perhaps to emigrate to the city or elsewhere in order to express themselves differently. Today there are still villages, but within the framework of these villages many different cultural patterns can be practiced because people have links to various points outside. A local village no longer has the power or ability to impose a single pattern. There is more variety at a very local level — and that was not true before. So I could move from the village level to a big-city level. If you traveled through Europe in 1850, the chances are that 98 percent of the population in any one of those cities only spoke the language of that city — and therefore, if you wanted to communicate, you would have to communicate in that language. In 1999, if I go to major cities in Europe, a good 50 percent of the population speaks at least one language other than their own — at least somewhat. And there might be many people in that city whose primary language is not the dominant lan-

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Selected Publications of Immanuel Wallerstein

Special Essay from the Director
Bleeding Dualism:
From Rwanda to Kosovo
By Ali A. Mazrui

What Is a Dual Society?
A dual society is one in which two ethnic groups add up to nearly 90 percent of the population. Dual societies present problems which are sometimes different from those of plural societies. In dual societies there is a higher risk of stalemate unless special care is taken — a higher risk of polarization. Strictly speaking, a dual society can be bi-national (as in the case of Czechs and Slovaks in the old Czechoslovakia), or bi-ethnic (as in the case of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda), or bi-sectarian (as in the case of the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland), or bi-regional (as in the case of the North and the South in the Sudan).

The month of April 1999 marked the coincidence of two events: the fifth anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, on one side, and, on the other side, the launching of NATO bombing in Kosovo and Serbia and the human deluge of the refugee exodus into Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. Both Rwanda and Kosovo are dual societies. The Rwanda genocide of 1994 was the fastest slaughter of people in post-colonial African history, which was later followed by the largest exodus of refugees. In April 1999, 20,000 Tutsi who were butchered in Kigali in 1994 were reburied. The Kosovo crisis in April 1999 provoked the largest exodus of refugees in Europe since World War II, and reports of the ethnic cleansing seem to be the most appalling in 50 years of European history.

Kosovo is not a simple case of a dual society of Serbs and ethnics. The Serbs revere Kosovo partly because of a battle in the 14th century (1389) which is supposed to have forged the modern identity of Serbia. In that battle the Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Turks — but that very martyrdom was the crucible of identity formation. By the 20th century, Kosovo was a dual society where the Serbs were a minority. They relied on neighboring Serbia to tilt the balance against the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo and against independence for Kosovo. The ethnic Albanians lost and were subjected to ethnic cleansing instead.

There are some commonalities between Rwanda and Kosovo: 1) Rwanda is an African dual society: Hutu and Tutsi confronting each other in a country of 7 million people. Kosovo is a European dual society: within Kosovo, there is an Albanian majority and a Serbian minority; within Serbia, there is a Serbian majority and an Albanian minority. 2) Rwanda has a long history of ethnic divide, going back generations, if not centuries. Kosovo has a long history of ethnic divide going back centuries — from pre-Ottoman Empire. 3) Rwanda has two powerful neighbors pulling in opposite directions: proto-Hutu Zaïre (Congo) and proto-Tutsi Uganda. Kosovo has two powerful neighbors pulling in opposite directions: fellow Serbs in Serbia to support Kosovo Serbs, and fellow Albanians in Albania to support Kosovo Albanians. 4) Rwanda has transnational ethnicity: Tutsi and Hutu spread across Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and, arguably, Uganda. Kosovo also has transnational ethnicity: there are Albanians in Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, as well as Albania.

But there are also differences between the two: 1) Rwanda is a fully sovereign state. Kosovo is a province of Serbia within a larger Yugoslav federation. 2) In Rwanda, the perpetrators of the 1994 atrocities came from within the territorial boundaries of Rwanda. In Kosovo, the perpetrators of the 1999 atrocities came mainly from the central government in Serbia outside the territorial boundaries of Kosovo. 3) In Rwanda, the forces committed to end the genocide in 1994 were territorially exogenous but ethnically indigenous — the Rwanda Patriotic Front was Tutsi, coming from Uganda. In Kosovo, the forces committed to end ethnic cleansing in 1999 were both territorially and ethnically exogenous — they were NATO forces. 4) In Rwanda, the large-scale killing was ended by fellow Tutsi from Uganda. In Kosovo, the large-scale ethnic cleansing may have to be ended by external Americans and West Europeans. 5) In Rwanda, those who were the victims of genocide (the Tutsi) were not the same as those who had to flee the country in their hundreds of thousands (the Hutu). In Kosovo, those who were the victims of the ethnic cleansing during the war (ethnic Albanians) were the same as those who poured out of Kosovo as refugees (mainly ethnic Albanians). 6) In Rwanda, the international community did very little to stop the genocide, although there were considerable warnings beforehand. In Kosovo, the international community — NATO, Russia, UN agencies, as well as the Clinton Administration — have been centrally involved in the crisis, though not primarily through the United Nations Security Council.

Sharing Power and Equalizing Skills
A solution to the problems of a dual society involves creative constitutional engineering. I agree with those who argue that the Westminster model of government can have a polarizing effect because of the principle that “winner takes all.” In a dual society the adversarial relationship between government and opposition can polarize the two ethnic groups if the voters vote along ethnic lines. A formula for power-sharing is therefore needed to reduce the tensions. One solution is to have a hegemonic political party or an umbrella political party. This has been the Zimbabwe solution under Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe is ethnically a dual society consisting of majority Shona and minority Ndebele. President Mugabe’s political party, ZANU-PF, has served...
Another solution would involve modifying the electoral system — with some seats elected by proportional representation and others according to some other system, including “first past the post.” But proportional representation has its hazards — including the risk of encouraging too many political parties, or giving small parties too much power. There is also the option of having governments of national unity as a method of guaranteeing that political power is indeed truly shared.

A more fundamental solution to the tensions of a dual society is to reduce the inequalities between the two groups. Matters can get rather difficult if one ethnic group in a dual society is economically or professionally much more successful than the other. Malaysia is, in some respects, a dual society — with Malays consisting of nearly half the population and ethnic Chinese nearly a third. Until the 1970s the ethnic Chinese were by far more entrepreneurial and more economically successful. The skill differential led to differences in income, and grievances exploded into the communal anti-Chinese riots of 30 years ago (1969). Since then, the Malaysian government has pursued affirmative action policies in favor of the economically disadvantaged but more numerous Malays. For more than a quarter of a century, Malaysia has contained the explosiveness of ethnic dualism by these affirmative action policies — and by a division of power in which Malays are politically pre-eminent, while Chinese continue to be economically triumphant.

The troubles between the Hutu and the Tutsi may or may not have originated in skill differences — but inequalities in privileges definitely developed, with the Tutsi as the upper stratum for most of their mutual history. In the past, when the Tutsi were on top, they never tried to even out the playing field. And when the Hutu prevailed, they discriminated against the Tutsi. The worst lesson in this tit-for-tat masochism was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

**Conclusion**

The long-term solution for Kosovo entails one of the following: EITHER a) a temporary period of protectorate under NATO or UN safeguards; b) partition, with a portion going to Albania and a portion to Serbia; c) independence for Kosovo; OR d) reintegration with Serbia under new conditions of peaceful co-existence.

The worst African cases of dual societies are indeed Rwanda and Burundi, each of which has majority Hutu and minority Tutsi. At the moment the minority Tutsi are in power in both Rwanda and Burundi. The scale of violence has cost hundreds of thousands of lives in the 1990s alone. There were earlier eruptions of comparable deadliness. In the case of the Hutu and the Tutsi, some have suggested that all Hutu should go to Burundi and all Tutsi to Rwanda — and make each country ethnically homogenous. Personally I do not favor such a solution, but such nightmares have to be considered if we do not succeed in containing the disruptive consequences of dualism.

What other solutions are available to dual societies generally? There are three other approaches — two of them desperate and the third more hopeful. One approach is to move from a dual to a single society. This is a cry of despair, because it means breaking up the country — as in the case of the split of Czechoslovakia or the special case of East Pakistan. Kosovo may also become a single society because of the exodus of the Kosovo Serbs. The second approach towards a solution is to move from dual to plural. This would involve regional integration, like the old Federation of the West Indies. My own recommended solution for Rwanda and Burundi has been to unite them with Tanzania. The armies of Rwanda and Burundi would be pensioned off, and the Hutu and Tutsi would discover how much they really have in common with each other in the peaceful political process of an enlarged Tanzania. The third redemptive approach for a dual society is neither to break it up into two single societies nor to unite it with a plural society, but to find satisfactory solutions within the country. This has been the way for Belgium — a dual society which was long divided between French speakers and Flemish speakers, but which, beginning with the Egmont Pact of 1977, has inaugurated a system of federal reconciliation between Dutch-speaking Flanders, French-speaking Wallonia and Brussels.

There may be other ways that can be explored to find satisfactory answers not only for the major ethnic groups in dual societies, but also for the minorities. Instead of ethnic cleansing, we need the cleansing of ethnicity — an effort to make ethnic differences culturally healthy rather than politically divisive.

Amen.

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**Between Guns and Gays**

In the concluding year of the century, Professor Mazrui made two separate trips to Uganda.

On the first trip he argued that some African countries were naturally coup-prone. On the second trip he suggested that some Africans could be naturally gay-oriented. Both propositions provoked national debates in Uganda.

During the first trip in August, Mazrui addressed members of Parliament. He argued that countries like Uganda were coup-prone, whereas countries like Tanzania and Senegal were almost coup-proof. The next day newspaper headlines said “MAZRUI WARNS UGANDA OF COUP.” On the second trip in October, Mazrui criticized Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, for his policy of harassing and imprisoning homosexuals. The next day the newspaper headlines said “MAZRUI DEFENDS HOMOS.” Mazrui traveled to Uganda on the second trip to address an international conference on “Constitutionalism in Africa: In Search of New Directions,” which was sponsored by the Ford Foundation. Mazrui’s own paper was on “Constitutional Change and Cultural Engineering: The African Experience.”
Racial Diversity and the Laws of Slavery

During 1998 and 1999, Cuba emerged as an area of research for IGCS. As part of the IGCS-Braudel Center Colloquium, Professor Ricardo René Laremont, associate director of IGCS, presented a lecture on “Law and Slavery in Cuba and the United States.” The lecture comparatively examined the development of the laws of slavery in Cuba and Virginia. Laremont also published, with Dr. Lisa Yun of Binghamton University’s English Department, an article comparing the Havana Afrocubano Movement with the Harlem Renaissance. The article appeared in Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society (Volume 1, No. 2, Spring 1999), published by Columbia University and Westview Press. That particular edition of the journal was dedicated to the theme of “Race and Revolution in Cuba.”

At his Braudel-IGCS lecture, Laremont discussed the legal aspects of slavery in Cuba and Virginia. A close comparison between court rulings and legal practices showed that while Virginia moved to incorporate race into its laws of slavery, Cuba’s laws were less racialized. Virginia’s laws after 1642 made the distinction between indentured and non-indentured labor. According to the new laws, these indentured laborers, who were mostly Irish, served their terms of labor for fixed terms, while non-indentured laborers, for the most part African slaves, underwent perpetual bondage. Collaboration between races and classes was actively discouraged from 1640 onwards. To better police black slaves, free blacks were encouraged to leave Virginia, and eventually inter-racial marriages and even inter-racial sexual relations became illegal.

Spanish law in Cuba, on the other hand, was less racialized and allowed for marriages within the slave community as well as outside of it. Slaves had some legal rights in Cuba, unlike in Virginia. Spanish law forbade dismemberment or murder of slaves; masters abusing slaves could be fined, prosecuted or have their slaves transferred to another owner; beating and whipping were allowed as long as no serious physical handicap ensued; slaves in Cuba had the right to a day of rest; elderly slaves were supposed to be taken care of; and, separate housing was provided for single men or women. Slaves could also farm for their own consumption and had the right to sell their excess production. So, in Cuba, slaves had legal rights but, practically, it is difficult to ascertain whether those rights were respected or enforced at all.

Yun’s and Laremont’s article in Souls examined the role of the intellectual in the formation of racial and national identities in both the Havana Afrocubano Movement and the Harlem Renaissance. In Cuba, especially after a racially motivated war in 1912, Cubans embarked upon two cultural strategies regarding race. One approach aggressively promoted the separation of the races and the derogation of the black race. Another approach re-examined the question of race and the definition of Cuban identity. This approach emerged from a historical experience within Cuba of tolerance of miscegenation and the acceptance of inter-racial offspring. From the 1920s onwards, a movement of Cuban intellectuals, led principally by mulattos and whites, eventually redefined Cuban national identity so that it included African religions and Africanty into the definition of what it meant to be Cuban. This objective within the Havana Afrocubano Movement led to a centering of Africanty within Cuban identity that was different from the employment of Africanty in the Harlem Renaissance. The principal leaders of the Harlem Renaissance worked toward a definition of American identity focused upon the cultural comparability and parallelism between African and European cultures, rather than African centrality within the definition of American identity. The Harlem Renaissance intellectuals created an African-American culture that became “comparable” to Anglo-Saxon culture while maintaining its separateness.

Laremont and Yun plan to continue collecting data and interviewing Cuban-African, Cuban-Chinese and the Afrochilatino communities in Cuba. Their next article will appear in The Journal of Asian American Studies.
IGCS News in Brief

- Ali A. Mazrui was elected chair of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID) based in Washington, D.C. The center organized a roundtable discussion on “Islam, Democracy, and Good Governance” on Nov. 22, 1999.

- In Edinburgh, Scotland, Ali A. Mazrui and the prominent Egyptian author Nawal El-Saadawi clashed during a panel presentation at the annual international conference on Africa, Islam, and Development organized by the Center of African Studies (CAS).

- Ali A. Mazrui was the keynote speaker at a conference on “Constitutionalism in Africa” held Oct. 5-8, 1999, in Kampala, Uganda.

- A celebration of the 10th anniversary of the appointment of Ali A. Mazrui to the Schweitzer Chair in Humanities at Binghamton University, State University of New York, was held Sept. 24, 1999. A distinguished crowd of more than 100 persons attended that celebration (see photos on page 11).

- Ricardo René Laremont was invited to present a series of papers in Singapore in February 1999. Laremont presented three papers at the National University of Singapore: “The Role of Colonial Law in the Formation of National Identity,” “Islam in America” and “The Myth of America: Towards an Understanding of Racial Harmony.” He also spoke on “Race, Islam, and Politics” before an audience of Singaporean journalists.

- Ricardo René Laremont’s book Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992 was just published by Africa World Press.

- Parviz Morewedge was invited to teach a class on Greek Sources in Islamic Philosophy at the Ismaili Institute of London, U.K.

- The institute co-sponsored the 32nd Annual Conference of Binghamton University’s Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies (CEMERS). The conference, coordinated by Prof. Khalil Senman, was titled “The Crusades: Other Experiences, Alternate Perspectives.”


- Bob Ostergrad, PhD, post-doctoral fellow at the institute, published an article on “The Political Economy of the South Africa-United States Patent Dispute” in the Journal of World Intellectual Property. The article details the AIDS epidemic in South Africa and the dispute that South Africa has with the United States over patent protection for AIDS drugs. He is also presenting this paper at the upcoming March 2000 International Studies Association meeting in Los Angeles.

PUBLICATIONS NEWS

Global Publications is a non-profit unit of Binghamton University. Operated under the Sponsored Funds Program, it publishes books and journals for the Institute of Global Cultural Studies (IGCS), the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies (CEMERS) and for other programs, institutions and individuals. Its primary aim is to contribute to a global understanding of different cultural traditions and to produce books that otherwise would not be widely available, such as translations of classics into English (from Arabic, Chinese, Ancient Greek, Persian, Latin, Sanskrit, Swahili and other languages). Global Publications is managed by IGCS’s Publications Manager and Senior Research Fellow, Dr. Parviz Morewedge.

This year, Global Publications embarked on various worthy projects, one of which is the launching of a bilingual book series. Here is a list of selected works that have been recently published and/or distributed through Global Publications:

\[ \text{Mwalimu Wa Kiswahili: A Language Teaching} \]
\[ \text{Manual, by Lioba Moshi, Abdur} \]
\[ \text{Nanji, Magdalena Hauner and John} \]
\[ \text{Mtembezi (published by the African} \]
\[ \text{Languages Teachers’ Association); Thomas} \]
\[ \text{Aquinas’ Earliest Treatment of the Divine} \]
\[ \text{Essence, edited and translated by Edward} \]
\[ \text{Macierowski; Saint Gregory Palamas On} \]
\[ \text{Simplicity, translated by Rein Ferwerda;} \]
\[ \text{Lieh-Hsein Chuan (biographies of the} \]
\[ \text{Holy Immortals), translated by Gary} \]
\[ \text{Williams; Shang-Tsa’i Yu-Lu, by Hsieh} \]
\[ \text{Liang-Tso, translated by Ron Guey Chu;} \]
\[ \text{Islam, Liberty and Development, by} \]
\[ \text{Mohammad Khatami; Thinking About} \]
\[ \text{Social Science, by Leon Goldstein; The} \]
\[ \text{Hellenic Philosophy: Between Europe,} \]
\[ \text{Asia, and Africa, by Christos Evangelidou;} \]
\[ \text{The Shi’a Philosophy of Amuli, by} \]
\[ \text{Morteza Agha Tehrani; Aristotle’s} \]
\[ \text{Nicomachean Ethics (new translation) and} \]
\[ \text{Commentary on Aristotle’s} \]
\[ \text{Nicomachean Ethics, by Kenneth Telford;} \]
\[ \text{The Future World Order, Volumes I-III, by} \]
\[ \text{Abdulaziz Al-Mubarak.} \]
Partnerships in Islamic Studies

Professor Mazrui was elected founding chair of the newly established Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, whose headquarters is in Washington, D.C. The mission of the center is to encourage research and dialogue about democracy and Islamic thought, as well as research about democratic experiments in the Muslim world. The executive director of the Center is Dr. Radwan Masmoudi.

Mazrui is a member of the board of directors of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He is also a member of the board of trustees of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, Oxford, England, and continues to serve as a member of the American Muslim Council, Washington, D.C.


Mazrui has continued his role as Ibn Khaldun Professor-at-Large at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences, Leesburg, Va. He serves as a special adviser and consultant to the president of the school, Sheikh Taha Alalwani.

International Book Launch


Message from the Director, continued from page 1

Did the people Gates interviewed have the remotest idea of his understanding of race? What is more, his translator seems determined to give the worst possible interpretation of what was being said by interviewees in a place like Lamu. Who is the best authority on Muslim atrocities in Zanzibar? Well, in Gates’ opinion, a Christian missionary priest in Zanzibar! Gates does not find it necessary to balance the testimony of such a biased witness with anyone else. Any journalist worth his salt would have done better!

I thought that in episode 3, which concerned the trans-Atlantic slave trade, Gates would at last regard the West and the white man as relevant actors in the African tragedy. Before seeing the episode I said to a colleague in Ohio that surely Gates could not deal with the trans-Atlantic slave trade without regarding the West and the white man as crucial! Was I wrong? Gates manages to make an African say that without the participation of Africans, there would have been no slave trade! How naive about power can we get?

Without the involvement of Africans, there would not have been colonialism either. Without the involvement of Africans, there would have been no apartheid. Without the involvement of African Americans, there would have been no segregationist order in the Old South. Why did Gates pick on the Asante (Ashanti) as collaborators in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and never mention European Jewish capitalists at all as collaborators in the slave trade?

I was so afraid that Gates’ fourth program would be insulting to Ethiopia that I was relieved that it was merely disrespectful. I wished he was more politely dressed when he was granted an audience to a major religious leader. I wished he kept his sarcasm about the authenticity of the Covenant in check. I wished he did not make as many snide remarks which trivialized other people’s values. And I wished that viewers were not kept informed on camera as to how many car breakdowns he had had. Surely he had better footage of African scenes!

His fifth program, on Timbuktu, returned to the issue of Africans enslaving each other. Gates seemed incapable of glorifying Africa without demonizing it in the second breath. Mali and Benin, countries of great ancient kings, were also countries of contemporary slavery. Gates refused to listen when he was told that the new “slave” could disobey his master, and was free to take

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Saying Goodbye to President Nyerere

Ali Mazrui last saw Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere in the final week of May 1999 in Abuja, Nigeria. Mazrui and the former president of Tanzania had been invited by the newly elected president of Nigeria, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, to be keynote speakers at a pre-inauguration workshop for parliamentarians on “Good Governance and Development in the New Nigeria.”

Less than six months later, the former president of Tanzania died of leukemia in a London hospital. He and Mazrui had known each other for more than 30 years. Shortly after Nyerere’s death, Cornell University hosted the annual conference of the African Heritage Studies Association. Mazrui was keynote speaker. He lectured on “The Future of Africana Studies and the Legacy of Julius K. Nyerere.”
10th anniversary celebration

Friends and colleagues celebrating at the 10th anniversary of Mazrui’s appointment to the Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities at Binghamton University.

From left: President Lois B. DeFleur, Dean Linda Blumer of the School of Education and Human Development, Prof. Rosmarie Morewedge and Prof. Parviz Morewedge

Prof. Anthony King, Grace Houghton, Prof. Charles Burroughs and Dean Susan Strehle of the Graduate School.

Prof. Richard Harris, Prof. Isidore Okpewho, Prof. N’dri Lumumba, Etin Anwar and Prof. Ayele Bekerie

Prof. Mazrui with Binghamton University President Lois B. DeFleur, Ricardo René Laremont, friends and colleagues

From left: Dr. Bob Ostergard, Dr. Joseph Wiley, Ruzima Sebuharara and Prof. Alamin Mazrui

Professor Mazrui with Mrs. Mazrui and Dr. Agneshwar.

From left: Profs. N’doi Assié-Lumumba, Darryl Thomas, Abdul Nanji and Tiffany Patterson

From left: Prof. Mazrui with Mrs. Mazrui and Dr. Agneshwar.
Greece and the Millennium

Binghamton University singled out the last semester of the millennium for a celebration of the Greeks across time and space. This institute was privileged to participate in this salute to Greece, including the publication of a number of texts of Greek philosophy, such as a new translation and commentary of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The director of this institute also marked the 32nd anniversary since he gave his Professorial Inaugural Lecture at Makerere University in Uganda. His inaugural lecture was on “Ancient Greece in African Political Thought." That was, of course, long before he became director of global cultural studies.

The Greeks are arguably the parents of rationalism, and by a strange destiny, they are also the parents of athleticism. They led the way in both mental and physical gymnastics! Through their philosophers, the Greeks climbed the Parnassus of intellectual achievement. Through their Olympic Games, the Greeks ran the mile of physical endurance. According to tradition, the Olympic Games were first celebrated in the year 776 BCE at Olympia, about 2,500 years before the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. The Olympics were repeated at intervals of four years until the Romans abolished them in 393 CE. The Olympics were revived in 1896 in a new stadium in Athens. Once again the Greeks were leading the world in the culture of the body - just as they once led the world in the culture of the mind. Their culture of the mind is also what our annual October conference has celebrated every year at Binghamton as the specialists have explored the philosophical riches of Aristotelian, Platonic and Neo-Platonic traditions.

The Greeks also gave us such concepts as "the philosopher king." On Oct. 23, 1999, in a village in faraway Tanzania, a philosopher king was buried. His name was Julius K. Nyerere. Nyerere was a ruler who was also a thinker. He was accorded the title of mwalamu, meaning "teacher" or "mentor." He was often in a class by himself as a national leader on the world scene - combining high ethics with high intellect. He was a philosopher-ruler in the best sense of the concept. Tanzania does not have Parnassus, the Mountain of the Muses. But it does have Kilimanjaro, Africa’s highest mountain - a physical pinnacle worthy of its intellectual son, Julius Nyerere.

Our October philosophical conferences have increasingly become a meeting of the minds, encounters of cultures, occasionally collisions of paradigms. We have annually provided an arena where Classicists meet Medievalists; Medievalists confront Modernists - across European, Islamic, African, Asian and other frontiers of knowledge.

This was Binghamton’s Greek semester - but other traditions remained resilient. There will always be much of Greece in the rest of the world. There will also be much of the world in the miracle of Greece. This institute is saying farewell to the second millennium. But global cultural studies eternally says "hello" to ancient Greece.

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autonomous employment. Gates was given this information and chose not to pursue it. Was it really a case of slavery? In this fifth episode Gates chose to denounce “the barbarity of female circumcision,” and yet the institution had just been mentioned in passing. There was no attempt to introduce the viewer as to why millions of Africans belonged to this culture of female circumcision in the first place. Africans were not, after all, innate barbarians. So why had this tradition survived for so long? The institution was mentioned as a throwaway “play to the Western feminist gallery.”

(I am myself opposed to female circumcision - but I do not call its practitioners barbarians.)

His sixth episode, on southern Africa, was to be the least upsetting. Gates did try to capture the glories of pre-colonial southern Africa and did pose some of the challenges of the post-colonial and post-apartheid eras. But even this sixth program was more of a tourist travelogue than a serious portrayal of a people. It is hard to believe that such a TV series was the product of such a brilliant mind!

These are my first reactions. If I can bear to view the series again, perhaps I should give it a second chance! But I fear that we have been let down badly!