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Dissertation Title: "The Same Passions for Party and Power: The Executive's Influence on Supreme Court Independence"
Chair: Jeff Yates
Committee: Wendy Martinek, Michael McDonald
Broadly, Scott's work entails empirical legal research. His dissertation addresses the iterative relationship between U.S. presidents and Supreme Court justices. Beyond his dissertation, Scott's research focuses on legal decision-making, Supreme Court legitimacy and public opinion, experimental design, and the U.S. presidency. His work has appeared in or is forthcoming in several peer-reviewed outlets.
Dissertation Title: The Effects of Exit Quality on the Strategic Dynamics of Civil War
Chair: David Clark
Committee: Ben Fordham, Michael Weintraub
Dissertation Synopsis: The dissertation argues that the quality of options available for civilians to exit from conflict zones shapes civilian choices to flee, and thus impacts the dynamics of civil conflict. To this end, I introduce a new measure of exit value, which accounts for both the forces that push civilians to flee - primarily violence against civilians - as well as the quality of the destinations available for flight. This includes original collection of time-series data on state practices towards refugees and asylum-seekers, comprising border closures, refoulement, and violence against refugees and asylum-seekers. Most immediately, this adds a new and vital element to predicting refugee flows; while violence makes civilians willing to flee, they may still lack the opportunity to do so. Low-quality exits, in conjunction with violence against civilians, lead to larger at-risk populations within conflict states, which creates larger pools of recruits and supporters for armed groups, greater attraction for humanitarian aid flows that are vulnerable to capture and fund the continuation of conflict, and slower economic recovery following the cessation of conflicts.
Dissertation Title: War Aims and War Termination: How States Prosecute Their Wars
Dissertation Chair: David H. Clark
Dissertation Committee: Benjamin O. Fordham, Amanda A. Licht
Dissertation Synopsis: The dissertation provides a theory of how military capabilities shape conflict behavior during crisis and war, arguing that military capabilities have both informative and materially coercive attributes. Capabilities are informative during crises, as military threats reveal private information, and are informative during war because fighting allows belligerents to overcome the problem of uncertainty about the outcome of the conflict. Military capabilities are materially beneficial during crises, as mobilization procures material advantages that shape states' probability of victory if hostilities escalate to war. Moreover, the material characteristic of capabilities is present during war, and allows states to impose costs on the battlefield by reducing their opponents' capacity to continue fighting. Wars begin and end because the material and informative characteristics of capabilities force states to revise their demands and war aims. I empirically evaluate the differential effects of capabilities at two points in time: First, I focus on prewar mobilization behavior, where states adjust their capabilities to enhance the material or informative nature of their military strength depending on whether they mobilize in public or private. Second, the project focuses on the actual prosecution of war on the battlefield, where I assess how materially coercive and informative military engagements shape the decision to continue fighting or terminate the conflict.
Dissertation Title: "Outside the Battlefield: Impact of Internal and External Political Dynamics on Civil Conflict Negotiations and Settlements"
Chair: Seden Akcinaroglu
Committee: Michael McDonald, Olga Shvetsova, Ricardo Laremont
Synopsis: This dissertation project examines the influence of various political dynamics on the decisions of governments and rebel groups to negotiate, settle, and commit to settlement's terms. The first chapter explores adversaries' internal political environment and argues that autonomy from constituent and elite obstruction is essential for negotiation and settlement. The second chapter studies the influence of external actors and argues that governments and rebel groups are more willing to negotiate a settlement when under pressure from their respective rivals to consolidate their scarce military or political resources. These chapters introduce original negotiations data for simultaneous estimation of negotiations and settlements. The third chapter analyzes the ways in which unilateral third-party intervention can stabilize or spoil post-settlement peace based on interveners' political interests. This dissertation expands our understanding of civil conflict resolution by examining its multiple stages and multi-actor dynamics.
Dissertation Title: "States and Human Rights Regimes: Advocacy, Treaty Participation, and Regime Complexity"
Chair: David Cingranelli
Committee: Ben Fordham, Katja Kleinberg
Dissertation Synopsis: The project evaluates state advocacy (sponsorship, speeches, and votes) in the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (United Nations General Assembly) as an indicator of state preferences for human rights, as well as multilateral approaches to enforcement. Preferences expressed in this Committee are informative because they help to explain human rights outcomes such as cooperation and expansion in the United Nations human rights regime, international human rights treaty ratification, and subsequent compliance. The project also provides a deeper understanding of human rights issues, international advocacy behaviors, and the interaction of states in an international setting.
Dissertation Title: "Losing by Winning Hearts and Minds Abroad: Impacts of Foreign Policy Choices on Foreign Public Opinion"
Chair: Benjamin O. Fordham
Committee: David H. Clark, Seden Akcinaroglu, Ekrem Karakoc
Dissertation Synopsis: Although many countries invest in “hearts and minds” strategies abroad, e.g., promoting human rights and democracy, providing foreign aid, and using public diplomacy effectively, these policies often do not succeed. My dissertation provides a new perspective on the effectiveness of such strategies by analyzing the perception of these policies among the targeted populations. My dissertation project specifically asks first, how the publics abroad perceive and assess the foreign policy choices of sender states, and second, how that perception shapes foreign public attitudes in return. By building on inter-group conflict in social identity and balance theories, I contend that distinct identities of individuals (e.g., political predisposition, ethnicity, religion) provide a unique lens through which they interpret foreign policies. And in return, individuals develop their attitudes towards the sender state, accordingly. By drawing on experimental and observational evidence, I examine the role of government-citizen relations, inter- group relations, and transnational ethnic-religious ties in conditioning individuals’ attitude formation towards foreign states. This research contributes to our understanding about the efficiency and effectiveness of soft power arguments. In fact, I detail the possible negative externalities of such policies. My dissertation also offers important policy implications for conflict prevention efforts.
Dissertation Title: "Individual Response to the Income Tax Rate: Economic Self-Interest, Principled Attitudes, and Fairness"
Chair: Michael D. McDonald
Committee: Daniel Magelby and Dave Clark
Dissertation Synopsis: For as long as survey organizations have asked respondents about their federal income taxes in the United States, the rich have been more likely to complain about the amount they are required to pay. At first glance, this pattern may not be puzzling. Yet this ignores the fact that the progressive income tax rates are based on principles that are supposed to be fair across different levels of income. The rich pay more because the marginal utility for money declines as income increases. The problem is that if the tax rate extracts the same utility from each citizen, complaints should be roughly the same across income groups. If the income tax rates are supposed to be fair, why do the rich complain more about their taxes? My dissertation explores the puzzle of why the rich are more likely to complain about their taxes considering a number of possible explanations. First, it examines whether this pattern is driven by self-interested policy attitudes. Next, it considers the possibility that differences in principled policy attitudes about what constitutes a fair tax rate can explain why the rich complain more. Finally, it examines whether the pattern of complaint stems from the fact that the tax rates are based on the wrong principle of vertical equity for at least some of the population.
Dissertation Title: "Globally Economic Competition, Politics and Labor Rights"
Chair: David Cingranelli
Committee: Mikhail Filippov, Amanda Licht
Dissertation Synopsis: The extant literature examines domestic policy changes under globalization by viewing them primarily as responses to international economic flows but overlooks the influences of policy choices by other states. Due to the costliness of altering polices, states make the alteration only when the cost of refusing the changes exceeds the cost of making the changes. As economic competition is globalized, policy changes in economic competitor states can often generate negative externalities to their "peers", which increase the cost of maintaining polices and pressure expansive policy convergence. Therefore, globalization influences domestic policy choices by making them more cross-nationally interdependent. Meanwhile, as policies differ from each other in their economic implications, pressure in different policy areas can cause either a race to the bottom or a race to the top. In addition, domestic institutions fundamentally shape the bargaining abilities of societal groups; the institutional variations should thus produce heterogeneous responses to the policy pressure. Employing new datasets and spatial econometric techniques (both conditional and non-conditional), this dissertation applies this theoretical framework to investigate changes in labor protection.
Dissertation Title: Information Bubbles & Echo Chambers: The Role of Social Identity in Macro-Opinion Development
Dissertation Chair: Jon Krasno
Dissertation Committee: Greg Robinson, Michael McDonald
Dissertation Synopsis:The collective will of the public plays a considerable role in the policy choices of Democracies. Yet, the forces that influence the behavior of aggregate public opinion are not well understood. Micro-level theories of attitude development in individuals, while offering valuable insight, cannot account for aggregate behavior. Empirically, macro-opinion is relatively stable, responsive to changing conditions in logical ways, and those of population subgroups generally move in tandem (Page and Shapiro 1992). This dissertation argues that social identity plays a vital role in this behavior. Both though the influence of, group membership and "the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (Tajfel 1974).
Dissertation Title: "Behavioral Determinants of Voting Coalitions and the Consequences of Electoral Institutions"
Chair: Olga V. Shvetsova
Committee: William B. Heller, Michael D. McDonald
Dissertation synopsis: My dissertation focuses on the ways campaigning - a short-term behavioral factor of voting - interacts with voters' strategic incentives in the process of the formation of voting coalitions. Campaign events affect voters' decisions in a predictable way, thereby providing voters with exogenous information about future vote distribution. This exogenous information facilitates voters' strategic responses - strategic voting and rational abstention. Using the data from India and Canada, I show that more intense and more centripetal campaigns increase the predictability of voting patterns and facilitate coordinated voting. Further, I utilize the quasi-experimental settings created by the institution of rolling elections in India to study the effect of longer campaigning on strategic voting and rational abstention. I find evidence that the length of campaigning has an inverse U-shaped relationship with voters' propensity to abandon nonviable candidates.